Sunday, November 29, 2009

Ontology Of The Flesh (Ponty Philosophy of Flesh)

Let us now return to our discussion of Merleau-Ponty's ontology. The guiding thread that we had been following was his critique of transcendental philosophy, particularly the notion of subjectivity that is implied in this philosophical project. In The Visible and the Invisible this critique is deepen and further developed. One could argue that, historically, the project of transcendental philosophy begins as a refutation of skepticism. By taking this stance, we begin by putting ourselves on the side of the negative. Like Stanley Cavell, Merleau-Ponty sees that the skeptic radically transforms the ordinary meaning of the question, "Do I know that?" Extending this question to everything changes its meaning. Merleau-Ponty claims that philosophy elects certain beings' "sensations, representations, thoughts, consciousness, or even a deceiving being--in order to separate itself from all being" (VI, 107). He argues that the radical skeptic borrows something from our experience, absolutizes it, then in his quest for complete certainty, he uses it to terrorize our experience of ‘inherence in the world’, an experience that Merleau-Ponty, in The Visible and the Invisible, calls "perceptual faith." Those who would begin philosophy by attempting to refute skepticism must also agree with the skeptic's rejection of our inherence in Being; they do so in the name of establishing absolute evidence which would deliver us from our contingent insertion into Being. Merleau-Ponty sees this ‘desire to be delivered from contingency’ operative in critical philosophy's effort to "undo our natural pact with the world in order to remake it." Its attempt to follow backward the path taken by the ‘subject who has constituted the object’ in order to arrive at the unity of subjectivity. It does so in a manner similar to the way one could walk indifferently in either direction from Notre Dame to the Etoile, or from the Etoile to Notre Dame.

It is Merleau-Ponty's contention that it is not possible to achieve this return to subjectivity. Reflection is always secondary, that is, it must recognize itself as founded on a pre-reflective experience of Being that cannot be assimilated, employing the felicitous phrase of Adorno, "without remainder." This reflection which must always be mindful of its own situated character is what Merleau-Ponty names "hyper-reflection." This sort of reflection is expressed in an excellent manner by a line of Kafka, cited by Lefort in his Preface to The Visible and the Invisible, "that things present themselves to him not by their roots, but by some point or another situated towards the middle of them" (VI, xvvi). Merleau-Ponty evokes our ineluctable inherence in Being as evidence that Husserl's project of free variation, while being useful, was not able to accomplish what Husserl desired of it. Free variation was Husserl's way to move from the register of ‘fact’ to that of ‘essence’. One begins with a real factual experience, then by means of free variation one transforms it in imagination up to the point where it is no longer an object of the same type. At this point, Husserl claims that we intuit its essential structure.

Merleau-Ponty agrees that we can vary our experience in imagination, that we can move from the real to the virtual, that is, we can give ourselves leeway. However, we cannot "complete" the circuit by which the real would become simply a variant of the possible. He writes, "On the contrary, it is the possible worlds and possible things that are variants and doubles of the actual world and of actual beings" (VI, 112). It is the ineluctability of our inherence in the world that forecloses both the attempt to move from the fact to the essential structure and the project of completing the phenomenological reduction.

In the last chapter of the never completed The Visible and the Invisible entitled "The Intertwining--the Chiasm," Merleau-Ponty begins to give a positive elaboration of the ontological position to which he has been led. In a number of respects, his last work distances itself from certain central notions in the phenomenological tradition. Nonetheless, in one respect it is mindful of Husserl's injunction, "Return to the things themselves." Merleau-Ponty wishes to begin in a dimension of experience which has not been "worked over, that offers us, all at once, pell-mell, both subject and object--both existence and essence--and, hence, gives philosophy resources to redefine them" (VI, 130). When Merleau-Ponty speaks of "perceptual faith" his notion of faith is perhaps the very opposite of the agonized Kierkegaardian "leap of faith." It is a faith the commitment of which has ‘always already’ been made, a faith which subtends the avowal of responsibility by which personal identity is formed. Perceptual faith is a faith that I am in no danger of losing, except in the philosophical interpretation of it which portrays it as knowledge. This chapter on what Merleau-Ponty calls the Chiasm is a continuation of his study of perception, however, at first viewing it may not appear as such. In the Phenomenology of Perception, he insisted upon making a distinction between operative intentionality and actThe Visible and the Invisible this distinction is deepened in such a way that the concept of intentionality itself is thrown into question. In his critical reflections on Sartre, which due to spatial constraints we have not been able to develop here, Merleau-Ponty said that for a subject defined as For-itself, as consciousness of itself, passivity could have no meaning. He argues that, defined as such, consciousness could not but be sovereign. intentionality, but in

In his late thought, Merleau-Ponty poses the question whether a consciousness, defined as intentional, is adequate to think a notion of perception viewed as the self-revelation of the sense of a world in and through a being which is itself a part of the world, flesh of its flesh, a world which "... is much more than the correlative of my vision, such that it imposes my vision upon me as a continuation of its own sovereign existence" (VI, 131). For him, to see is not to pose a thing as the object pole, much less a noema (Husserl), of my act of seeing. Rather seeing is being drawn into a dimension of Being, a tissue of sensible being to which the perceiving body is not foreign. Merleau-Ponty speaks of the perception of the color ‘red’ as not merely the awareness of a quality belonging to an object. He claims that for an experience ‘prior to being worked over’, it is an encounter with "a punctuation in the field of red things, which includes the tiles of rooftops; the flags of gatekeepers and of the revolution; of certain terrains near Aix or Madagascar. It is also a punctuation in the field of red garments, which includes, along with the dresses of women, the robes of professors, bishops and advocates general...and its red is literally not the same if it appears in one constellation or in another....A certain red is also a fossil, drawn up from the depths of imaginary worlds" (VI, 132). When seeing, I do not hold an object at the terminus of my gaze, rather I am delivered over to a field of the sensible which is structured in terms of the "difference between things and colors, a momentary crystallization of colored being or visibility" (VI, 132).

When we turn in the direction of the seer, we do not discover a transcendental ego but a being who is itself of the sensible, a being which "knows it before knowing it"(VI, 133). The sensate body possesses "an art of interrogating the sensible according to its own wishes, an inspired exegesis" (VI, 135). If I wish to feel the cloth of a coat that I am about to purchase, it will not suffice if I pound it with my fists or quickly wisk my hand over it. Rather it must be touched as it wishes to be touched and for this my body needs no instruction. Like the cloth, my hand is a part of the tangible world; between it and the rest of the tangible world there exists a "relationship by principle" (VI, 133). My hand which touches the things is itself subject to being touched. "Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its own movements incorporate themselves in the universe that they interrogate, are recorded on the same map as it" (VI, 133).

Merleau-Ponty writes, "it is not different for vision." He argues that it is essential that the seer itself must be visible, that is, seeable; he refers to the body as an "exemplar sensible" being both sensate and sensible. As in the case with touching, there is a pre-possession of the vision by the visible, and vice versa. The body, being itself visible, uses its being to participate in the being of the visible world. Rather than speaking of the act of seeing, one ought to speak of a "visibility, sometimes wondering, sometimes reassembled" (VI, 138). What Merleau-Ponty calls "flesh" is the generality of the sensible, "an anonymity innate to myself" (VI, 133). We see that there is a progression of Merleau-Ponty's ontology which moves from the notion of Gestalt in The Structure of Behavior, to the notion of ‘the one’ (the on) that is the ‘subject’of perception in the Phenomenology of Perception, then to the notion of the Flesh in The Visible and the Invisible. The flesh is neither some sort of ethereal matter nor is it a life force that runs through everything. Rather it is a notion which is formed in order to express the intertwining of the sensate and the sensible, their intertwining and their reversibility. It is this notion of reversibility that most directly problemetizes the concept of intentionality, since rather than having the model of act and object, one has the image of a fold, and of the body as the place of this fold by which the sensible reveals itself.

We see that this notion of intertwining does not only concern the relationship between the sensible and the sensate, between the body and the world. It also orchestrates the relationship between the visible and the invisible. As Merleau-Ponty undercuts, or if one prefers deconstructs, the opposition between subject and object, he also wishes to do the same for the opposition between the visible and the invisible, the sensible and the ideal. We have seen this project already operating in The Structure of Behavior, where he viewed the human order, which is to say the order of symbolic behavior, as a sublation of both physical and vital structures. Also in The Visible and the Invisible he searchs for an "infrastructure" of thought in the body. This infrastructure is located in the body's non-coincidence with itself. In his reflection on the touching-touched , he has shown that my hand, my eye, my voice is both touching, seeing and speaking, and at the same time tangible, visible and audible. However, between these two dimensions there is a non-coincidence; I never, at the same instance, experience my hand as touching and as touched. He writes, "Either my right hand really passes over to the rank of the touched, but then its hold on the world is interrupted, or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do not really touch it" (VI, 148).

There is a divergence (écart) which short-circuits the body's immanence with itself and creates an internal fissure in the visible, thereby generating differentiation rather than identity. There is, Merleau-Ponty says, a sort of reflection that the body effects on itself. Six pages before this incompleted text breaks off, he tells us that we have reached the "most difficult point," that is, "the bond between flesh and idea, and the internal armature which [it] manifests and which it conceals" (VI, 149). The invisible, the idea, is not the contrary of the visible, it is the invisible ofRemembrance of Things Past signify Swann's love for Odette, as an instance of a meaning that cannot be extracted from its sensible incarnation but which, nonethelesss, is itself not strictly speaking sensible. Permit me to use another example. Harry Matthews, in my opinion a very important American writer, when he finished his undergraduate studies at Harvard University went to live in Paris where he has lived for the past 40 years or so. He is obviously completely fluent in French, but he writes in English. At a public lecture, someone asked if he ever thought of writing in French. His answer was a definite "no" because he said that to write in French, as he does in English, it would have been necessary to have attended high school in France. In the context, it was clear that he did not mean that there were certain expressions that French school children use that he does not know. Rather he meant that he did not have a sense of the sensible infrastructure which underlies forms of popular speech, like Proust's ‘little phrases’ which cannot be abstracted from their context. As Merleau-Ponty claims that there is "an ideality that is not alien to the flesh, that gives it its axis, its depth, its dimensions." the visible. Merleau-Ponty evokes Proust's notion of the "little phrase" in the musical piece, which in

There are meanings that can be abstracted from the sensible body but not from "another, less heavy, more transparent, body, as though it were to change flesh, abandoning the flesh of the body for that of language, and thereby [they] would be emancipated, but not freed, from every condition" (VI, 153). Language is a more diaphanous body, but body nonetheless, which is capable of sedimentation, of forming a world which, in Hannah Arendt's phrase, houses the speaker. The notion of "the invisible of the visible" continues the theme of a logos of the perceived world that we discovered in the Phenomenology of Perception, along with the theme of silence significance (pre-linguistic meaning), a silence which is not the contrary of language. In 1961 Merleau-Ponty's own voice fell silent. But insofar as it provokes speech, it was a silence which was not the contrary of language.

If we think how the thought of Merleau-Ponty might prolong itself into the 21st century, or as it protends a future, then we cannot not be struck by the fact that his philosophy does not entertain any conception whatsoever of an ‘apocalyptic end of philosophy’ followed by the emergence of some essentially different mode of thought. Unlike Heidegger, there is no anticipation of an ‘other beginning’, also there is nothing like Derrida's ‘Theory’ which is waiting in the wings to displace philosophy, and unlike Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty's thought does not await the disappearence of philosophy. In the academic year 1958-1959, Merleau-Ponty gave a course at the Collège de France entitled "Our State of Non-Philosophy." He began by saying that ‘for the moment’ philosophy is in a crisis, but he continued, "My thesis: this decadence is inessential; it is that of a certain type of philosopher…. Philosophy will find help in poetry, art, etc., in a closer relationship with them, it will be reborn and will re-interprete its own past of metaphysics—which is not past" (Notes de cours, 1959-60, p.39. my translation). After writing this he turns to literature, painting, music, and psychoanalysis for philosophical inspiration.

The theme of the indeterminate frequently recurs in the thought of Merleau-Ponty. Philosophy is enrooted in the soil of our culture and its possibilities are not infinite, but neither are they exhausted. In an essay entitled "Everywhere and Nowhere, " Merleau-Ponty explicitly reflects on the future of philosophy, he writes that philosophy "will never regain the conviction of holding the keys to nature or history in its concepts, and it will not renounce its radicalism, that search for presuppositions and foundations which has produced the great philosophies" (Signs, 157). In his Inaugural Address to the Collège de France, he claimed that "philosophy limps" and further on that "this limping of philosophy is its virtue" (In Praise of Philosophy, 61).

What will philosophy do in the 21st century? It will limp along.

Next explanation :

Wednesday, October 8, 2008

Arah dan Kecenderungan Filsafat Barat Masa Kini: Sebuah Sketsa

Oleh Prof. Dr. Ignatius Bambang Sugiharto*

Masa kini” adalah titik temu masa lalu dan masa depan. Maka, tulisan ini seyogianya meneropong arus-arus filsafat mana dari masa lalu yang agaknya kini berpeluang menentukan kecenderungan-kecenderungan filsafat di masa depan. Meskipun demikian, tulisan ini sebetulnya tidak seambisius itu. Sebab, yang saya buat hanyalah sebuah sketsa kasar.

Sktesa Situasi
Bila kita ikuti perbincangan di berbagai jurnal maupun literatur filsafat, maka sebetulnya hampir semua filsuf yang pernah dikenal dalam tradisi filsafat Barat ternyata masih selalu dibicarakan. Barangkali ini keunikan bidang filsafat: nyaris tak mungkin menganggap seorang filsuf dari masa mana pun sebagai sungguh-sungguh “kadaluwarsa”.

Meskipun demikian, ada beberapa tema, tokoh, dan jalur tradisi yang toh terasa mendominasi arena wacana filsafat hari-hari ini. Oleh karena itu, tulisan ini hanya akan menyoroti tema-tema tersebut. Dan, berharap melalui itu terlihat pula filsuf dan tradisi mana yang kini dominan. Di antara demikian banyak tema, beberapa di antaranya yang menonjol, yakni: 1) Bahasa, 2) Kritik atas modernitas/isme, 3) Tentang “yang lain” (otherness), 4) Komunikasi/dialog.

1 Bahasa
Sejak beberapa dekade yang lalu beredar istilah “Linguistic Turn”. Meskipun istilah ini kini memang telah memudar, tapi esensinya masih berbunyi: bahasa adalah tema sentral filsafat abad 20. Kini banyak tema pokok tradisional filsafat memang berlabuh dalam persoalan bahasa. Tentu saja sejak zaman Yunani, bahasa sudah selalu berperan penting dalam filsafat. Namun, selama itu, bahasa itu sendiri tidak pernah sungguh-sungguh dipersoalkan sebagai tema utama. Baru pada awal abad 20, sejak G. E. Moore dan Bertrand Russell yang memuncak pada Wittgenstein, bahasa menjadi tema kajian utama, bahkan hingga kini (abad 21). Tradisi analitik ini mencoba menunjukkan bahwa banyak persoalan dasar filsafat tradisional hanyalah semu: hanya perkara logika dan bahasa belaka. Sejak itu, mulai ada kecenderungan kuat untuk memperkarakan hakekat “filsafat” itu sendiri dari sudut bahasa. Dengan kata lain, terjadi kesibukan menuju ke arah filsafat tentang filsafat: “Metafilsafat”.

Perspektif yang terakhir itu memunculkan issue baru seperti: apakah bahasa pengetahuan itu memang harus satu dan universal, katakanlah bahasa “ideal” seperti yang umum dicita-citakan filsafat modern, ataukah dibiarkan saja dalam berbagai “Language games” sesuai dengan bentuk-bentuk kehidupan yang memang beragam, sebutlah bahasa “natural”. Kebenaran dan penalaran dilihat erat berkaitan dengan bahasa. Persoalan ini kini masih juga digumuli oleh generasi mutakhir tradisi analitik macam H. PUTNAM, D. DAVIDSON dan M. DUMMET. Situasi ini pada gilirannya telah ikut memicu lahirnya issue kontemporer tentang “Berakhirnya Filsafat” (The End of Philosophy), khususnya pada pemikiran R. RORTY, yang mengolah persoalan filsafat analitik dari perspektif J. DEWEY.

Namun kendati tradisi WITTGENSTEIN telah memperkarakan hakekat bahasa, pada umumnya tradisi analitik tidak banyak mengolah aspek ontologis bahasa, tetapi aspek logis dan epistemologisnya saja. Aspek ontologis bahasa diolah terutama oleh HEIDEGGER dari perspektif tradisi Fenomenologi Husserlian: bagi manusia yang tinggal di dalam dunia, bahasa itu akhirnya apa. Bahasa baginya adalah cara makna “ada” yang tampil sekaligus bersembunyi. Karena itu, bagi HEIDEGGER berfilsafat berarti “mendengarkan” bahasa, terutama bahasa puisi alias bahasa metaforis. Tradisi ini selanjutnya menjadi semakin vocal pada H. G. GADAMER, yang mengolah kebahasaan manusia dalam konteks hermeneutika filsafat dimana bahasa menjadi semacam pusat gravitasi bagi filsafat, bahkan bagi segala bentuk pemahaman tentang “Ada”. Katakanlah bahasa di sini adalah “Ada yang bisa dimengerti”, bahkan bisa juga dikatakan bahwa bahasa adalah “pikiran” itu sendiri. Dengan kata lain, tak ada cara lain untuk memikirkan kenyataan selain lewat bahasa. Tradisi fenomenologi dan hermeneutika ini diperdalam juga oleh filsuf lain: P. RICOEUR dengan mendialogkannya pada Psikoanalisa dan Strukturalisme. Pada pemikiran Ricoeur aspek kreativitas bahasa dalam proses pemahaman menjadi lebih jelas lagi. Yang menarik bagi Ricoeur adalah bahwa ia berhasil mengangkat issue penting dalam persoalan bahasa, yang sempat dipicu Heidegger juga, yaitu posisi metafora. Penelitiannya yang mendalam tentang metafora ternyata kemudian mengakibatkan perhatian panggung filsafat kontemporer bergeser dari persoalan logika ke persoalan metafora.

Agak di luar jalur itu, tradisi teori kritis Frankfurt pun ternyata akhirnya ikut juga mengolah persoalan bahasa dan hermeneutika. Tokoh terakhir tradisi ini adalah J. HABERMAS, misalnya menggunakan pola logika hermeneutic di balik “model interaksinya” yang memupuk kepentingan berkomunikasi dan saling mengerti. Dan, bahasa dilihat sebagai tempat bersembunyinya kepentingan-kepentingan penguasaan dan distorsi-distorsi dalam komunikasi.

Di samping semua jalur di atas, tradisi Strukturalisme masih perlu dilihat, kendati kini tampil justru dalam sosok baru: Post-strukturalisme J. DERRIDA, yang merupakan kombinasi antara strukturalisme dengan inspirasi Heidegger. Strukturalisme sendiri sudah selalu menganggap bahasa sebagai model sistem dan struktur tanda yang sangat menentukan segala pola pemikiran manusia tentang makna. Namun, bila strukturalisme cenderung melihat bangunan-bangunan struktur itu sebagai statis, maka Post-strukturalisme melihatnya justru sebagai sangat dinamis. Unit dasar yang memungkinkan segala struktur makna adalah pasangan-pasangan oposisi biner bahas belaka. Namun, karena setiap kata mengandaikan dan menunjukkan kata lainnya (trace) menjadi mata rantai tanpa ujung, maka sebetulnya makna adalah produk bahasa itu sendiri, bukan ciptaan penulisnya/pembicaranya. Demikian pada Derrida, bahasa menjadi sesuatu yang otonom. Maka, terjadilah “Kematian sang Pengarang”, kata filsuf Post-strukturalisme lainnya, ROLAND BARTHES. Segala bentuk tulisan maupun tafsiran akhirnya hanyalah kegiatan “bermain” geser-menggeser dan mengombinasikan makna belaka. Dengan kata lain, pada Derrida seluruh kegiatan berbahasa akhirnya secara radikal bersifat metaforis.

2. Kritik atas Modernitas/isme
Kritik atas pola pikir modern sebetulnya sudah dilakukan sejak awal kemunculan filsafat modern dan selanjutnya. B. Pascal, Hegel, F. Schiller, dan Nietzsche misalnya, telah melakukan hal itu. Namun, kritik tersebut saat itu nyatanya hanya merupakan riak-riak kecil sesaat saja. Kritik atas kemodernan mulai menjadi riak agak besar kiranya baru sejak Heidegger yang – berdasarkan inspirasi Fenomenologi Husserlian – mengkritik tradisi filsafat Barat yang telah berjalan hingga Nietzsche dan Hegel. Kritiknya terasa serius oleh sebab ia berhasil menggugat pola berpikir dualistik Subjek-Objek yang bersifat penguasaan, kalkulatif, dan manipulatif, di balik Metafisika yang telah memuncak pada IPTEK. Di sisi lain, Eksistensialisme pun memanfaatkan Fenomenologi Husserl dan dengan berbagai cara mulai mencoba keluar dari pola berpikir filsafati modern juga. Lalu yang dilakukan para fenomenolog macam Merleau-Ponty dan Levinas pun sebetulnya adalah upaya yang sama.

Namun, kritik atas kemodernan tiba-tiba menjadi gelombang besar sejak tampilnya J. F. LYOTARD, terutama karena ia melontarkan istilah yang sangat eksplisit: “Postmodernisme” yang kontroversial itu. Secara eksplisit sebetulnya gelombang kritik atas kemodernan telah muncul dalam segala istilah “post”, misalnya post-metafisik, post-Hegelian, post-Analitik, post-Strukturalisme, post-industrial, post-western, dan sebut saja segala “post” lainnya. Dengan begitu, seolah istilah “postmodern” seperti merangkum semua gejala tersebut, dan itu pula sebabnya istilah “postmodern” cenderung dikait-kaitkan dengan semua “post” lainnya itu hingga isinya memang kabur. Gelombang ini semakin hiruk-pikuk dengan munculnya J. BAUDRILLARD, F. JAMESON, R. RORTY yang memperkarakan kemodernan secara eksplisit juga.

Dengan caranya sendiri, jalur tradisi genealogi Nietzsche pun ternyata bersuara kembali lewat inspirasi strukturalisme. Dan itu menghasilkan kritik yang sangat mendasar, meskipun ganjil, terhadap kemodernan. Ini nampak pada pemikiran MICHEL FOUCAULT, J. DERRIDA, G. DELEUZE, dan ROLAND BARTHES.

Dari tradisi teori kritis, yang sebetulnya dilakukan J. HABERMAS sebenarnya tiada lain adalah upaya merevisi kemodernan juga. Maka, sebetulnya perdebatannya tentang istilah “postmodern” di sini terasa semu.

Dari bidang filsafat moral, muncul pula kritik tajam terhadap tradisi modern umumnya, yaitu: A. MacINTYRE, lalu Z. BAUMAN. Sedangkan dari filsafat ilmu, kritik mendasar lahir dari THOMAS KUHN, I. LAKATOS, dan FEYERABEND.

Yang menarik adalah bahwa dari tradisi filsafat proses pun lahir jalur yang eksplisit menggunakan istilah “postmodern” yaitu kelompok Studi Proses: D. R. GRIFFIN, F. FERRE, dsb., yang sering bergabung dengan para fisikawan macam D. BOHM, I. PRYGOGINE, dsb. kelompok ini mengolah inspirasi WHITEHEAD dan perkembangan ilmiah terbaru. Dengan itu mereka lalu mengadakan revisi mendasar atas paradigma-paradigma dan menawarkan “worldview” baru. Agaknya kelompok ini adalah satu-satunya kubu yang berani merancang “metafisika” baru di tengah-tengah suasana skeptik dan pesimis dunia filsafat umumnya.

Demikian kritik atas kemodernan memang bukan sekedar kekhasan pemikiran Lyotard, Foucault, atau Derrida, melainkan merupakan kecenderungan umum para filsuf kontemporer. Tidaklah mengherankan karenanya bila “Postmodernisme” pun menjadi semacam umbrella term yang mudah dikenakan pada siapapun di antara mereka.

3. Yang Lain (Otherness)
Suatu hal yang mencolok di panggung filsafat hari ini adalah juga kecenderungan umum untuk memberi tekanan dan penghargaan pada “Yang Lain” atau “Lyan”. Itu bisa berarti “Ada” Heideggerian yang senantiasa mengelak dari kategori Metafisika dan IPTEK; bisa juga “Orang Lain” a la Levinas yang tak pernah diberi tempat layak dalam tradisi pemikiran modern yang subjektivistis (Egologis); atau bisa juga berarti peran sentral “irasionalitas”, “ketaksadaran”, unsur-unsur “pra-konseptual” dan “nonkonseptual” seperti dilacak para filsuf Frankfurt dan Strukturalisme; atau “kegilaan” dan “diskontinuitas sejarah” Foucaultian yang senantiasa dianak-tirikan dalam pola pikir modern; atau “instabilitas makna, struktur, dan sistem” Derridean yang jarang terpikir oleh para filsuf modern; atau peran sentral “hasrat (desire), kehendak untuk berkuasa (will to power)” dan “tubuh” a la DELEUZE (dirintis oleh Schopehauer, Nietzsche, lalu Merleu-Ponty dan P. Ricoeur). Bahkan yang termasuk dalam kategori “yang lain” adalah “rasionalitas komunikatif” Habermasian; “paralogi” a la LYOTARD; “segala bentuk pengetahuan non-ilmiah” versi Feyerabend; “aspek retorik dan sosiologis dunia ilmiah” menurut THOMAS KUHN; hingga berbagai bentuk gerakan Feminisme, holisme ataupun ekologi.

Demikian pendeknya pergeseran fokus terhadap “yang lain” itu, atau yang biasa dikenal sebagai Paradigm Shift beberapa dekade ini kiranya memang telah menggoncang secara radikal segala sistem kategori yang biasa kita gunakan dalam memahami realitas. Akibat yang paling serius agaknya adalah bahwa kita dipaksa mengkaji ulang hakekat konsep-konsep dasar seperti “rasionalitas”, “kebenaran”, “pengetahuan”, bahkan “filsafat” itu sendiri. Barangkali ini salah satu sebabnya mengapa zaman kita ini terasa sangat kontradiktif, over-skeptik, chaotic, bahkan mungkin tergelincir ke belukar schizophrenic.

4. Komunikasi/Dialog
Secara ringkas dapat dikatakan bahwa filsafat masa kini kehilangan kepastian-kepastian terutama tentang keniscayaan rasionalitas, otonomi subjek dan kemurnian objek. Sistem kategori, aturan, dan kriteria yang biasanya dianggap produk wacana dan tindakan rasional kini dianggap bersifat sementara dan konvensional saja. Makna dan validitas segala bentuk wacana ternyata banyak tergantung pada “bentuk-bentuk kehidupan” yang sangat partikular dan spesifik (Wittgenstein) tapi juga pada karakter “retoris” dan “metaforis” setiap wacana dan tindakan itu (Kuhn. Derrida, Rorty, H. Blumenberg). Cara subjek memahami realitas ternyata juga ditentukan sekali oleh keterikatannya pada dunia objek alias pada “Lebenswelt” yang pra-reflektif dan nonkonseptual (Husserl, Heidegger, Ponty, Tylor). Konsep tentang “evidensi” (self-evident givenness atau “presence”) ternyata sangat ditentukan oleh sistem differensial tanda-tanda kebahasaan (Derrida). Objek pengetahuan pun sebetulnya tak pernah sedemikian netral sebab selalu terbungkus pra-interpretasi, selalu telah disituasikan dalam suatu “skema”, yang merupakan bagian dari “konteks makna” tertentu (Donald Davidson) atau pun bagian dari sebuah “teks” yang juga mengacu pada teks-teks lain tanpa akhir (Derrida).

Ambruknya segala kepastian itulah kini yang agaknya membawa kecenderungan filsafat berubah dari pola monologis menuju dialogis. Itu bisa berupa dialog hermeneutis antar horizon tradisi dan horizon aktual (Gadamer, Ricoeur); dialogis politis yang kritis dan emansipatoris terutama di kalangan para ilmuan ataupun antara perspektif filsafat dan perspektif ilmu-ilmu empiris (Habermas); dialog antar berbagai model pemahaman (G. Madison); dialog antar “Language games” (Rorty, Wittgenstein); dialog dalam bentuk relasi etis asimetris antara saya dan “orang lain” (Levinas); dialog antara rasionalitas dan kegilaan (Michel Foucault), antara rasionalitas dan kehendak/hasrat (Deleuze), antara konsep literal dan metaphor (Heidegger, Ricoeur, Davidson, Madison), tapi juga antara diskursif (konsep) dan pola figural (imaji) sebagaimana diserukan Lyotard.

Posisi Filsafat Kini
Situasi ketidak-tentuan akibat ambruknya berbagai kategori dasar dan berubahnya paradigma tadi pada gilirannya memang membawa krisis mendasar pada jati diri filsafat itu sendiri. Orang suka menganggap bahwa setelah periode “post-metafisika” dan segala “post” lainnya, kini giliran filsafat itu sendiri lenyap, alias “Post-filsafat” (Rorty).

Tentu saja klaim tentang kematian filsafat sangat relatif: tergantung “filsafat” dalam arti apa. Bila filsafat diartikan sebagai “satu-satunya bahasa standard yang paling rasional dan paling mendasar, yang karenanya paling layak mendasari keabsahan segala bentuk pengetahuan”, maka boleh jadi ia kini hanya tinggal ilusi. Tetapi arti tersebut hanyalah menunjuk pada salah satu kemungkinan fungsi filsafat saja. Di sisi lain, kiranya jelas bahwa segenap issue yang telah dikemukakan di depan merupakan tantangan untuk memikirkan ulang dan merumuskan kembali hakekat dan posisi filsafat saat ini. Dalam rangka itu barangkali beberapa gagasan berikut bisa berguna.

Pertama, filsafat bisa tetap dilihat sebagai medan kegiatan dimana rasionalitas mengadakan kritik terhadap dirinya sendiri (Teori Kritis). Dan ini dapat dilakukan dengan cara menyingkap kondisi-kondisi intensionalitas dasar di balik berbagai pola pemahaman kita terhadap realitas (Fenomenologi, Hermeneutika). Artinya, salah satu tugas filsafat yang unik dan sangat penting barangkali terletak pada kecenderungannya untuk mengkaji kembali segala bangunan teoretis pengetahuan berdasarkan pengalaman konkret kita dalam lebenswelt (hidup sehari-hari yang kita alami). Dengan kata lain, filsafat di sini berfungsi sebagai upaya mengartikulasikan atau mengeksplisitkan dimensi-dimensi yang tersembunyi dalam lebenswelt itu (kepentingan, prasangka kebahasaan, kekuasaan, hasrat, sentralitas tubuh, keter-arahan pada orang lain, dll.) ke tingkat kesadaran, dalam rangka pemahaman diri yang lebih kaya tentang manusia. Upaya macam ini barangkali tak akan ada akhirnya.

Kedua, dalam rangka kritik-diri rasionalitas dan artikulasi Lebenswelt itu filsafat sebetulnya perlu bergaul erat dengan kesenian. Seni adalah bentuk refleksi kritis dan jalur artikulasi Lebenswelt juga namun dalam bentuk metaforik. Manakala filsafat menempuh jalur logika konseptual rasional, seni menempuh jalur logika imaji dan sensibilitas yang cenderung intuitif. Manakala filsafat menjelajahi medan kesadaran, seni berpetualang mondar-mandir antara medan kesadaran dan ketaksadaran. Antara keduanya sesungguhnya terdapat hubungan komplementer. Filsafat bisa mendapat nutrisi dan bahan lauk yang sangat vital-substansial dari seni, dan sebaliknya.

Ketiga, adapun terhadap ilmu-ilmu empiris (Human Sciences) filsafat dapat bekerjasama erat dengan berfungsi sebagai: pertama, ia dapat membantu menyingkapkan bentuk-bentuk kemampuan dan pengetahuan prateoritik di balik kompetensi-kompetensi manusia dalam berbicara, memahami, menilai, dan bertindak. Kedua, ia pun dapat memasok gagasan-gagasan yang dapat berfungsi sebagai hipotesa-hipotesa empirik. Ini inspirasi bagus dari Habermas.

Keempat, ketika dalam kehidupan kontemporer saat ini terdapat keterpisahan antara tiga pola reflektif penting yaitu seni, sains dan agama, maka filsafat sebetulnya dapat mengaktifkan hubungan dialetik dan dialogis antara ketiganya. Dengan cara ini filsafat dapat tetap berperan sebagai wahana keutuhan kemanusiaan dan integritas pengetahuan. Selamat membaca!

* Prof. Dr. Ignatius Bambang Sugiharto adalah Dosen Filsafat di Fakultas Filsafat Unpar, menyelasaikan S-3 Filsafat di Universitâ san Tomasso, Roma, Italia. Sekarang menjabat sebagai Presiden Asian Association of Catholic Philosophers dan Sekjen International Society for Universal Dialogue (New York)

Curriculum Vitae
Igantius Bambang Sugiharto lahir di Tasikmalaya, 6 Maret 1956. Menyelesaikan program S1 di Fakultas Filsafat Unpar tahun 1981. Pada tahun 1984 beliau menyelesaikan Program S1 di Fakultas Sastra, Jurusan Filsafat Universitas Indonesia. Mendapat gelar Licensiat (Magna cum Laude) dari Universitâ san Tomasso, Roma, Italia tahun 1992, dan meraih gelar Doktor Filsafat (Summa cum Laude) dari universitas yang sama tahun 1994.

Beliau mengajar di Universitas Katolik Parahyangan sejak tahun 1984 terutama di Fakultas Filsafat, kemudian mengajar juga di program Pascasarjana, sambil menjabat sebagai Pembantu Dekan I Fakultas Filsafat hingga saat ini. Selain itu, beliau mengajar di program Pascasarjana Fakultas Seni Rupa dan Desain ITB dan FSRD Maranatha.

Tulisan-tulisan beliau tersebar dalam berbagai buku, nasional maupun internasional, juga dalam berbagai media dan jurnal (Kompas, Tempo, Suara Pembaruan, Basis, Kalam, dsb). Beliau juga sering membawakan makalah dalam berbagai fora, nasional maupun internasional (Canada, Amerika, Denmark, Finlandia, Yunani, Korea, Jepang, China, Meksiko, dsb).

Aktif terlibat dalam berbagai organisasi dan proyek penelitian Internasional, antara lain: Presiden, Asian Association of Catholic Philosophers; Sekjen, International Society fo Universal Dialogue (New York); Research Fellow, Centre International Pour L’étude Comparée de Philosophie at D’esthétique (Tokyo & Copenhagen); Research Fellow, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington DC); Research Fellow, Institute for Advanced Study of Asian Cultures and Theologies (Hongkong); anggota, International Society for Metaphysics (Washington DC); anggota, Asosiasi Ahli Filsafat Indonesia (ASAFI); Anggota, Himpunan Dosen Etika Indonesia (HIDESI). Ketekunannya di bidang filsafat membuahkan hasil. Pada tanggal 16 Desember 2006 beliau dikukuhkan sebagai Guru Besar Filsafat Universitas Katolik Parahyangan.

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

Pernyataan Menolak Praktik Hukuman Mati

Dengan ini dinyatakan bahwa saya sebagai pribadi:

1. menolak tegas praktik hukuman mati di Indonesia

2. mendesak untuk dilakukannya amandemen perundangan tentang vonis hukuman mati

3. mengganti hukuman mati dengan praktik hukuman lainnya yang lebih manusiawi

4. mendesak pemerintah untuk mengadakan serta memodifikasi penjara atau lembaga pemasyarakatan dengan level keamanan penuh dan terpencil
kepada terhukum vonis hukuman

Monday, July 30, 2007


By: Daniel Bell

Modern-day communitarianism began in the upper reaches of Anglo-American academia in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls' landmark 1971 book A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971). Drawing primarily upon the insights of Aristotle and Hegel, political philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer disputed Rawls' assumption that the principal task of government is to secure and distribute fairly the liberties and economic resources individuals need to lead freely chosen lives. These critics of liberal theory never did identify themselves with the communitarian movement (the communitarian label was pinned on them by others, usually critics),[1] much less offer a grand communitarian theory as a systematic alternative to liberalism. Nonetheless, certain core arguments meant to contrast with liberalism's devaluation of community recur in the works of the four theorists named above (Avineri & de-Shalit 1992, Bell 1993, Berten et al. 1997, Mulhall & Swift 1996, and Rasmussen 1990) ,and for purposes of clarity one can distinguish between claims of three sorts: methodological claims about the importance of tradition and social context for moral and political reasoning, ontological or metaphysical claims about the social nature of the self, and normative claims about the value of community.[2]

This essay is therefore divided in three parts, and for each part I present the main communitarian claims, followed by an argument (in each part) that philosophical concerns in the 1980s have largely given way to the political concerns that motivated much of the communitarian critique in the first place.

1. Universalism Versus Particularism

Communitarians have sought to deflate the universal pretensions of liberal theory. The main target has been Rawls description of the original position as an ‘Archemedian point’ from which the structure of a social system can be appraised, a position whose special virtue is that it allows us to regard the human condition ‘from the perspective of eternity’,[3] from all social and temporal points of view. Whereas Rawls seemed to present his theory of justice as universally true, communitarians argued that the standards of justice must be found in forms of life and traditions of particular societies and hence can vary from context to context. Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor argued that moral and political judgment will depend on the language of reasons and the interpretive framework within which agents view their world, hence that it makes no sense to begin the political enterprise by abstracting from the interpretive dimensions of human beliefs, practices, and institutions (Taylor 1985, ch. 1; MacIntyre 1978, chs.18-22 and 1988, ch.1; Benhabib 1992, pp. 23-38, 89n4). Michael Walzer developed the additional argument that effective social criticism must derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places. Even if there is nothing problematic about a formal procedure of universalizability meant to yield a determinate set of human goods and values, ‘any such set would have to be considered in terms so abstract that they would be of little use in thinking about particular distributions’ (Walzer 1983, 8; Young 1990, 4). In short, liberals who ask what is just by abstracting from particular social contexts are doomed to philosophical incoherence and liberal theorists who adopt this method to persuade people to do the just thing are doomed to political irrelevance.

Rawls has since tried to eliminate the universalist presuppositions from his theory. In Political Liberalism, (Rawls 1993) he argues in a communitarian vein that his conception of the person as impartial citizen provides the best account of liberal-democratic political culture and that his political aim is only to work out the rules for consensus in political communities where people are willing to try for consensus. In the Law of Peoples, (Rawls 1999) he explicitly allows for the possibility that liberalism may not be exportable at all times and places, sketching a vision of a ‘decent, well-ordered society’ that liberal societies must tolerate in the international realm. Such a society, he argues, need not be democratic, but it must be non-aggressive towards other communities, and internally it must have a ‘common good conception of justice’, a ‘reasonable consultation hierarchy’, and it must secure basic human rights. Having said that, one still gets the sense that the liberal vision laid out in A Theory of Justice is the best possible political ideal, one that all rational individuals would want if they were able to choose between the available political alternatives. There may be justifiable non-liberal regimes, but these should be regarded as second best to be tolerated and perhaps respected, not idealized or emulated.

Other liberal theorists have taken a harder line against communitarian concessions, arguing that liberal theory can and should present itself as a universally valid ideal. Brian Barry, for one, opens his widely cited book Justice as Impartiality by boldly affirming the universality of his theory: ‘I continue to believe in the possibility of putting forward a universally valid case in favor of liberal egalitarian principles’ (Barry 1995, 3). Barry does recognize that a theory of justice must be anchored in substantive moral considerations, but his normative vision appears to be limited to the values and practices of liberal Western societies. He seems distinctly uninterested in learning anything worthwhile from non-Western political traditions: for example, his discussion of things Chinese is confined to brief criticisms of the Cultural Revolution and the traditional practice of foot-binding. One might consider the reaction to a Chinese intellectual who puts forward a universal theory of justice that draws on the Chinese political tradition for inspiration and completely ignores the history and moral argumentation in Western societies, except for brief criticisms of slavery and imperialism.

Still, it must be conceded that 1980s communitarian theorists were less-than-successful at putting forward attractive visions of non-liberal societies. The communitarian case for pluralism for the need to respect and perhaps learn from non-liberal societies that may be as good as, if not better than, the liberal societies of the West may have been unintentionally undermined by their own use of (counter) examples. In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre defended the Aristotelian ideal of the intimate, reciprocating local community bound by shared ends, where people simply assume and fulfill socially given roles (MacIntyre 1984). But this pre-modern Gemeinschaft conception of an all-encompassing community that members unreflectively endorse seemed distinctly ill-suited for complex and conflict-ridden large-scale industrialized societies. In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer pointed to the Indian caste system, ‘where the social meanings are integrated and hierarchical’ (Walzer 1983, 313) as an example of a non-liberal society that may be just according to its own standards. Not surprisingly, few readers were inspired by this example of non-liberal justice (not to mention the fact that many contemporary Indian thinkers view the caste system as an unfortunate legacy of the past that Indians should strive hard to overcome). In short, this use of ill-informed examples may have unintentionally reinforced the view that there are few if any justifiable alternatives to liberalism in modern societies. Communitarians could score some theoretical points by urging liberal thinkers to be cautious about developing universal arguments founded exclusively on the moral argumentation and political experience of Western liberal societies, but few thinkers would really contemplate the possibility of non-liberal practices appropriate for the modern world so long as the alternatives to liberalism consisted of Golden Ages, caste societies, fascism, or actually-existing communism. For the communitarian critique of liberal universalism to have any lasting credibility, thinkers need to provide compelling counter-examples to modern-day liberal-democratic regimes and 1980s communitarians came up short.

By the 1990s, fairly abstract methodological disputes over universalism versus particularism faded from academic prominence, and the debate now centers on the theory and practice of universal human rights. This is largely due to the increased political salience of human rights since the collapse of communism in the former Soviet bloc. On the liberal side, the new, more political voices for liberal universalism have been represented by the likes of Francis Fukuyama, who famously argued that liberal democracy's triumph over its rivals signifies the end of history (Fukuama 1992). This view also revived (and provoked) the second wave communitarian critique of liberal universalism and the debate became much more concrete and political in orientation.

Needless to say, the brief moment of liberal euphoria that followed the collapse of the communism in the Soviet bloc has given way to a sober assessment of the difficulties of implementing liberal practices outside the Western world. It is now widely recognized that brutal ethnic warfare, crippling poverty, environmental degradation, and pervasive corruption, to name some of the more obvious troubles afflicting the developing world, pose serious obstacles to the successful establishment and consolidation of liberal democratic political arrangements. But these were seen as unfortunate (hopefully temporary) afflictions that may delay the end of history when liberal democracy has finally triumphed over its rivals. They were not meant to pose a challenge to the ideal of liberal democracy. It was widely assumed that liberal democracy is something that all rational individuals would want if they could get it.

The deeper challenge to Western liberal democracy has emerged from the East Asian region.[4] In the 1990s, the debate revolved around the notion of ‘Asian values’, a term devised by several Asian officials and their supporters for the purpose of challenging Western-style civil and political freedoms. Asians, they claim, place special emphasis upon family and social harmony, with the implication that those in the chaotic and crumbling societies of the West should think twice about intervening in Asia for the sake of promoting human rights and democracy. As Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew put it, Asians have ‘little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suits them better than the individualism of America’.[5] Such claims attracted international attention primarily because East Asian leaders seemed to be presiding over what a U.N. human development report called ‘the most sustained and widespread development miracle of the twentieth century, perhaps all history’.[6] In 1997-98, however, the East Asian miracle seemed to have collapsed. And it looks like Asian values was one casualty of the crisis.

The political factors that focused attention on the East Asian challenge remain in place, however. East Asian economies (with the notable exception of Indonesia) have been slowly recovering. China in particular looks set to become an economic and political heavyweight with the power to seriously challenge the hegemony of Western liberal democratic values in international fora. Thus, one hears frequent calls for cross-cultural dialogue between the West and the East designed to understand and perhaps learn from the other side. Failing to take seriously East Asian political perspectives risks widening misunderstandings and setting the stage for hostilities that could have been avoided.

From a theoretical point of view, however, it must be conceded that the official debate on Asian values has not provided much of a challenge to dominant Western political outlooks. The main problem is that the debate has been led by Asian leaders who seem to be motivated primarily by political considerations, rather than by a sincere desire to make a constructive contribution to the debate on universalism versus particularism. Thus, it was easy to dismiss — rightly so, in most cases — the Asian challenge as nothing but a self-serving ploy by government leaders to justify their authoritarian rule in the face of increasing demands for democracy at home and abroad.

Still, it would be a mistake to assume that nothing of theoretical significance has emerged from East Asia. The debate on Asian values has also prompted critical intellectuals in the region to reflect on how they can locate themselves in a debate on human rights and democracy in which they had not previously played a substantial part. Neither wholly rejecting nor wholly endorsing the values and practices ordinarily realized through a liberal democratic political regime, these intellectuals are drawing on their own cultural traditions and exploring areas of commonality and difference with the West. Though often less provocative than the views of their governments in the sense that few argue for the wholesale rejection of Western-style liberal democracy with an East Asian alternative these unofficial East Asian viewpoints may offer more lasting contributions to the debate. Let me (briefly) note three relatively persuasive East Asian arguments for cultural particularism that contrast with traditional Western arguments for liberal universalism (see Bell 2000, ch. 1):

  1. Cultural factors can affect the prioritizing of rights, and this matters when rights conflict and it must be decided which one to sacrifice. In other words, different societies may rank rights differently, and even if they face a similar set of disagreeable circumstances they may come to different conclusions about the right that needs to be curtailed. For example, U.S. citizens may be more willing to sacrifice a social or economic right in cases of conflict with a civil or political right: if neither the constitution nor a majority of democratically elected representatives support universal access to health care, then the right to health care regardless of income can be curtailed. In contrast, the Chinese may be more willing to sacrifice a civil or political liberty in cases of conflict with a social or economic right: there may be wide support for restrictions on the right to form independent labor associations if they are necessary to provide the conditions for economic development. Different priorities assigned to rights can also matter when it must be decided how to spend scarce resources. For example, East Asian societies with a Confucian heritage will place great emphasis upon the value of education, and they may help to explain the large amount of spending on education compared to other societies with similar levels of economic development.
  2. Cultural factors can affect the justification of rights. In line with the arguments of ‘1980s communitarians’ such as Michael Walzer, it is argued that justifications for particular practices valued by Western-style liberal democrats should not be made by relying on the abstract and unhistorical universalism that often disables Western liberal democrats. Rather, they should be made from the inside, from specific examples and argumentative strategies that East Asians themselves use in everyday moral and political debate. For example, the moral language (shared even by some local critics of authoritarianism) tends to appeal to the value of community in East Asia, and this is relevant for social critics concerned with practical effect. One such communitarian argument is that democratic rights in Singapore can be justified on the grounds that they contribute to strengthening ties to such communities as the family and the nation (see below, section III).
  3. Cultural factors can provide moral foundations for distinctive political practices and institutions (or at least different from those found in Western-style liberal democracies). In East Asian societies influenced by Confucianism, for example, it is widely held that children have a profound duty to care for elderly parents, a duty to be forsaken only in the most exceptional circumstances.[7] In political practice, it means that East Asian governments have an obligation to provide the social and economic conditions that facilitate the realization of this duty. Political debate tends to center on the question of whether the right to filial piety is best realized by means of a law that makes it mandatory for children to provide financial support for elderly parents as in mainland China, Japan, and Singapore or whether the state should rely more on indirect methods such as tax breaks and housing benefits that simply make at-home care for the elderly easier, as in Korea and Hong Kong. But the argument that there is a pressing need to secure this duty in East Asia is not a matter of political controversy.

Thinkers influenced by East Asian cultural traditions such Confucianism have also argued for distinctive as-yet-unrealized political practices and institutions that draw on widely-held cultural values for inspiration. For example, Korean scholars Hahm Chaihark and Jongryn Mo argue for the need to revive and adapt for the contemporary era such Choson dynasty institutions as policy lectures and the Confucian censorate, traditional institutions that played the role of monitoring the dealings of the Emperor (Hahm 2003, Mo 2003, Bell 2000, ch. 5).

In contrast to 1980s communitarian thinkers, East Asian critics of liberal universalism have succeeded in pointing to particular non-liberal practices and institutions that may be appropriate for the contemporary world. Some of these may be appropriate only for societies with a Confucian heritage, others may also offer insights for mitigating the excesses of liberal modernity in the West. What cannot be denied is that they have carried forward the debate beyond the implausible alternatives to liberalism offered by 1980s communitarian thinkers.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that contemporary communitarians have not been merely defending parochial attachments to particular non-liberal moralities. Far from arguing that the universalist discourse on human rights should be entirely displaced with particular, tradition-sensitive political language, they have criticized liberals for not taking universality seriously enough, for failing to do what must be done to make human rights a truly universal ideal. These communitarians — let us label them the ‘cosmopolitan critics of liberal universalism’ — have suggested various means of improving the philosophical coherence and political appeal of human rights.

In fact, there is little debate over the desirability of a core set of human rights, such as prohibitions against slavery, genocide, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination. These rights have become part of international customary law, and they are not contested in the public rhetoric of the international arena. Of course many gross violations occur off the record, and human rights groups such as Amnesty International have the task of exposing the gap between public allegiance to rights and the sad reality of ongoing abuse. This is largely practical work, however. There is not much point writing about or deliberating about the desirability of practices that everyone condemns at the level of principle.

But political thinkers and activists around the world can and do take different sides on many pressing human rights concerns that fall outside what Walzer terms the ‘minimal and universal moral code’ (Walzer 1987, 24; Walzer 1994). This gray area of debate includes criminal law, family law, women's rights, social and economic rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, and the attempt to universalize Western-style democratic practices. The question is: how can the current thin list of universal human rights be expanded to include some of these contested rights?

Charles Taylor has put forward the following proposal (Taylor 1999). He imagines a cross-cultural dialogue between representatives of different traditions. Rather than argue for the universal validity of their views, however, he suggests that participants should allow for the possibility that their own beliefs may be mistaken. This way, participants can learn from each others ‘moral universe’. There will come a point, however, when differences cannot be reconciled. Taylor explicitly recognizes that different groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations hold incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, and human nature. In response, Taylor argues that a ‘genuine, unforced consensus’ on human rights norms is possible only if we allow for disagreement on the ultimate justifications of those norms. Instead of defending contested foundational values when we encounter points of resistance (and thus condemning the values we do not like in other societies), we should try to abstract from those beliefs for the purpose of working out an ‘overlapping consensus’ of human rights norms. As Taylor puts it, ‘we would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief’ (Taylor 1999, 124).

While Taylor's proposal moves the debate on universal human rights forward, it still faces certain difficulties. For one thing, it may not be realistic to expect that people will be willing to abstract from the values they care deeply about during the course of a global dialogue on human rights. Even if people agree to abstract from culturally specific ways of justifying and implementing norms, the likely outcome is a withdrawal to a highly general, abstract realm of agreement that fails to resolve actual disputes over contested rights. For example, participants in a cross-cultural dialogue can agree on the right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment while radically disagreeing upon what this means in practice — a committed Muslim can argue that theft can justifiably be punished by amputation of the right hand,[8] whereas a Western liberal will want to label this an example of cruel and unusual punishment.

As we have seen, the debate on universalism versus particularism has moved from fairly abstract methodological disputes between Anglo-American philosophers to relatively concrete international political disputes between philosophers, social scientists, government officials, and NGO activists. The distinctive communitarian contribution has been to cast doubt on universal theories grounded exclusively in the liberal moralities of the Western world, on the grounds that cultural particularity should both make one sensitive to the possibility of justifiable areas of difference between the West and the rest and to the need for more cross-cultural dialogue for the purpose of improving the current thin human rights regime. Various contributions from East Asia and elsewhere have given some meat to these challenges to liberal universalism. In any case, let us now turn to the second main area of controversy between liberals and communitarians — the debate over the self that has similarly moved from philosophy to politics.

2. The Debate Over the Self

Communitarian thinkers in the 1980s such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argued that Rawlsian liberalism rests on an overly individualistic conception of the self. Whereas Rawls argues that we have a supreme interest in shaping, pursuing, and revising our own life-plans, he neglects the fact that our selves tend to be defined or constituted by various communal attachments (e.g., ties to the family or to a religious tradition) so close to us that they can only be set aside at great cost, if at all. This insight led to the view that politics should not be concerned solely with securing the conditions for individuals to exercise their powers of autonomous choice, as we also need to sustain and promote the social attachments crucial to our sense of well-being and respect, many of which have been involuntarily picked up during the course of our upbringing. First, however, let us review the ontological or metaphysical debate over the self that led to this political conclusion.

In an influential essay titled ‘Atomism’, Charles Taylor objected to the liberal view that ‘men are self-sufficient outside of society’. (Taylor 1985, 2000) Instead, Taylor defends the Aristotelian view that ‘Man is a social animal, indeed a political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self-sufficient outside a polis’ (Taylor 1985, 190). Moreover, this atomistic view of the self can undermine liberal society, because it fails to grasp the extent to which liberalism presumes a context where individuals are members of, and committed to, a society that promotes particular values such as freedom and individual diversity. Fortunately, most people in liberal societies do not really view themselves as atomistic selves.

But do liberal thinkers actually defend the idea that the self is created ex-nihilo, outside of any social context and that humans can exist (and flourish) independently of all social contexts? In fact, Taylor's essay was directed at the libertarian thinker Robert Nozick. As it turns out, the communitarian critique of the atomistic self does not apply to Rawslian liberalism: in Part III of Theory of Justice, Rawls pays close attention to the psychological and social conditions that facilitate the formation of liberal selves committed to justice. But few readers ever got to Part III of Rawls massive tome, so communitarians got quite a bit of mileage from their critique of liberal atomism. This charge didn't stick, however.

While liberals may not have been arguing that individuals can completely extricate themselves from their social context, the liberal valuation of choice still seemed to suggest an image of a subject who impinges his will on the world.[9] Drawing on the insights of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, communitarians argued that this view neglects the extent to which individuals are embodied agents in the world. Far from acting in ways designed to realize an autonomously arrived-at life-plan, vast areas of our lives are in fact governed by unchosen routines and habits that lie in the background. More often than not we act in ways specified by our social background when we walk, dress, play games, speak, and so on without having formulated any goals or made any choices. It is only when things break down from the normal, everyday, unchosen mode of existence that we think of ourselves as subjects dealing with an external world, having the experience of formulating various ways of executing our goals, choosing from among those ways, and accepting responsibility for the outcomes of our actions. In other words, traditional intentionality is introduced at the point that our ordinary way of coping with things is insufficient. Yet this breakdown mode is what we tend to notice, and philosophers have therefore argued that most of our actions are occasioned by processes of reflection. Liberals have picked up this mistaken assumption, positing the idea of a subject who seeks to realize an autonomously arrived-at life-plan, losing sight of the fact that critical reflection upon ones ends is nothing more than one possibility that arises when our ordinary ways of coping with things is insufficient to get things done.

Some liberals have replied by recognizing the point that vast areas of our lives are governed by unchosen habits and routines, that the deliberate, effortful, choosing subject mode may be the exception rather than the rule. They emphasize, however, that the main justification for a liberal politics concerned primarily with securing the conditions for individuals to lead autonomous lives rests on the possibility and desirability of normative self-determination, that is,on the importance of making choices with respect to things that we value (Doppelt 1989). While it may be true that certain communal practices often, or even mostly, guide our behavior behind our backs, it doesn't follow that those practices ought to be valued, or reflectively endorsed in non-ordinary moments of existence, much less that the government ought somehow to promote these practices. And what liberals care about ultimately is the provision of the rights, powers, and opportunities that individuals need to develop and implement their own conceptions of the good life.

This qualified version of the liberal self, however, still seems to imply that moral outlooks are, or should be, the product of individual choice. One's social world, communitarians can reply, provides more than non-moral social practices like table manners and pronunciation norms — it also provides some sort of orientation in moral space. We cannot make sense of our moral experience unless we situate ourselves within this given moral space, within the authoritative moral horizons. What Charles Taylor calls ‘higher, strongly evaluated goods’ (Taylor 1989) — the goods we should feel committed to, those that generate moral obligations on us regardless of our actual preferences are not somehow invented by individuals, but rather they are located within the social world which provides one's framework of the lower and the higher. Thus, the liberal ideal of a self who freely invents her own moral outlook, or private conception of the good, cannot do justice to our actual moral experience.

But once again, liberals need not deny the assumption that our social world provides a framework of the higher and the lower nor need it be presumed that we must regard our own moral outlook as freely invented. Will Kymlicka, for example, explicitly recognizes that things have worth for us in so far as they are granted significance by our culture, in so far as they fit into a pattern of activities which is recognized by those sharing a certain form of life as a way of leading a good life (Kymlicka 1989, 166). That one's social world provides the range of things worth doing, achieving, or being does not, however, undermine the liberal emphasis on autonomy, for there is still substantial room for individual choice to be made within this set. The best life is still the one where the individual chooses what is worth doing, achieving, or being, though it may be that this choice has to be made within a certain framework which is itself unchosen.

Communitarians can reply by casting doubt on the view that choice is intrinsically valuable, that a certain moral principle or communal attachment is more valuable simply because it has been chosen following deliberation among alternatives by an individual subject. If we have a highest-order interest in choosing our central projects and life-plans, regardless of what is chosen, it ought to follow that there is something fundamentally wrong with unchosen attachments and projects. But this view violates our actual self-understandings. We ordinarily think of ourselves, Michael Sandel says, ‘as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic’, (Sandel 1981, 179) social attachments that more often than not are involuntarily picked up during the course of our upbringing, rational choice having played no role whatsoever. I didn't choose to love my mother and father, to care about the neighborhood in which I grew up, to have special feelings for the people of my country, and it is difficult to understand why anyone would think I have chosen these attachments, or that I ought to have done so. In fact, there may even be something distasteful about someone who questions the things he or she deeply cares about — certainly no marriage could survive too long if fundamental understandings regarding love and trust were constantly thrown open for discussion! Nor is it obvious that, say, someone who performs a good deed following prolonged calculation of pros and cons is morally superior than a Mother-Teresa type who unreflectively, spontaneously acts on behalf of other people's interests.

Liberals can reply that the real issue is not the desirability of choice, but rather the possibility of choice. There may well be some unchosen attachments that need not be critically reflected upon and endorsed, and it may even be the case that excessive deliberation about the things we care about can occasionally be counter-productive. But some of our ends may be problematic and that is why we have a fundamental interest in being able to question and revise them. Most important is not choosing our own life-plans; rather, liberalism founded on the value of self-determination requires only that we be able to critically evaluate our ends if need be, hence that ‘no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination’ (Kymlicka 1989, 52; Dworkin 1989, 489; Macedo 1990, 247). For example, an oppressed woman has a fundamental interest in being able to critically reflect upon traditional understandings of what it means to be a good wife and mother, and it would be unjust to foreclose her freedom to radically revise her plans.

This response, however, still leaves open the possibility of a deep challenge to liberal foundations. Perhaps we are able to reexamine some attachments, but the problem for liberalism arises if there are others so fundamental to our identity that they cannot be set aside, and that any attempt to do so will result in serious and perhaps irreparable psychological damage. In fact, this challenge to liberalism would only require that communitarians be able to identify one end or communal attachment so constitutive of one's identity that it cannot be revised and rejected. A psychoanalyst, for example, may want to argue that (at least in some cases) it is impossible to choose to shed the attachment one feels for one's mother, and that an attempt may lead to perverse and unintended consequences. A feminist theorist may point to the mother-child relationship as an example of a constitutive feature of one's identity and argue that any attempt to deny this fails to be sensitive to women's special needs and experiences (Frazer & Lacey 1993, 53-60). An anthropologist may argue on the basis of field observations that it is impossible for an Inuit person from Canada's far north to suddenly decide to stop being an Inuit and that the only sensible response is to recognize and accept this constitutive feature of his identity. Or a gay liberation activist may claim that it is both impossible and undesirable for gays to repress their biologically-given sexual identity. These arguments are not implausible, and they seem to challenge the liberal view that no particular end or commitment should be beyond critical reflection and open to revision.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we can identify one particular attachment so deeply-embedded that it is impossible to really bring to conscious awareness and so significant for one's well-being that an individual can only forsake commitment to its good at the cost of being seriously psychologically disturbed. This end is beyond willed change and one loses a commitment to it at the price of being thrown into a state of disorientation where one is unable to take a stand on many things of significance (Taylor 1989, 26-7). Does this really threaten liberal politics? It may, if liberal politics really rests on the liberal self. Fortunately, that is not the case. Rereading some of the communitarian texts from the 1980s, there seems to have been an assumption that once you expose faulty foundations regarding the liberal self, the whole liberal edifice will come tumbling down. The task is to criticize the underlying philosophy of the self, win people on your side, and then we can move on to a brand new communitarian society that owes nothing to the liberal tradition. This must have been an exhilarating time for would-be revolutionaries, but more level-headed communitarians soon realized that overthrowing liberal rights was never part of the agenda. Even if liberals are wrong to deny the existence of constitutive ends — even if the philosophical justifications for a liberal form of social organization founded on the value of reflective choice are rotten to the core — there are still many, relatively pragmatic reasons for caring about rights in the modern world. To name some of the more obvious benefits, liberal rights often contribute to security, political stability and economic modernization.

In short, the whole debate about the self appears to have been somewhat misconceived. Liberals were wrong to think they needed to provide iron-clad philosophies of the self to justify liberal politics, and communitarians were wrong to think that challenging those foundations was sufficient to undermine liberal politics. Not surprisingly, both sides soon got tired of debating the pros and cons of the liberal self. By the early 1990s, this liberal-communitarian debate over the self had effectively faded from view in Anglo-American philosophy.[10]

So what remains of the communitarian conception of the self? What may be distinctive about communitarians is that they are more inclined to argue that individuals have a vital interest in leading decent communal lives, with the political implication that there may be a need to sustain and promote the communal attachments crucial to our sense of well-being. This is not necessarily meant to challenge the liberal view that some of our communal attachments can be problematic and may need to be changed, thus that the state needs to protect our powers to shape, pursue, and revise our own life-plans. But our interest in community may occasionally conflict with our other vital interest in leading freely chosen lives, and the communitarian view is that the latter does not automatically trump the former in cases of conflict. On the continuum between freedom and community, communitarians are more inclined to draw the line towards the latter.

But these conflicts cannot be resolved in the abstract. Much turns on empirical analyses of actual politics — to what extent our interest in community is indeed threatened by excess liberal politics, to what extent the state can play a role in remedying the situation, to what extent the nourishment of communal ties should be left to civil society, and so on. This is where the political communitarians of the last decade have shed some light. Let us now turn to the politics of community, the third major strand of the communitarian thought.

3. The Politics of Community

In retrospect, it seems obvious that communitarian critics of liberalism may have been motivated not so much by philosophical concerns as by certain pressing political concerns, namely, the negative social and psychological effects related to the atomistic tendencies of modern liberal societies. Whatever the soundness of liberal principles, in other words, the fact remains that many communitarians seem worried by a perception that traditional liberal institutions and practices have contributed to, or at least do not seem up to the task of dealing with, such modern phenomena as alienation from the political process, unbridled greed, loneliness, urban crime, and high divorce rates. And given the seriousness of these problems in the United States, it was perhaps inevitable that a second wave of 1990s communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni and William Galston would turn to the more practical political terrain of emphasizing social responsibility and promoting policies meant to stem the erosion of communal life in an increasingly fragmented society.[11] Much of this thinking has been carried out in the flagship communitarian periodical, The Responsive Community, which is edited by Amitai Etzioni and includes contributions by an eclectic group of philosophers, social scientists, and public policy makers [this periodical, regrettably, folded in summer 2004 due to financial constraints]. Etzioni is also the director of a think-tank, Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, that produces working papers and advises government officials in Washington.[12]

Such political communitarians blame both the left and the right for our current malaise (Bell 1997). The political left is chastised not just for supporting welfare rights economically unsustainable in an era of slow growth and aging populations, but also for shifting power away from local communities and democratic institutions and towards centralized bureaucratic structures better equipped to administer the fair and equal distribution of benefits, thus leading to a growing sense of powerlessness and alienation from the political process. Moreover, the modern welfare state with its universalizing logic of rights and entitlements has undermined family and social ties in civil society by rendering superfluous obligations to communities, by actively discouraging private efforts to help others (e.g., union rules and strict regulations in Sweden prevent parents from participating voluntarily in the governance of some day care centers to which they send their children), and even by providing incentives that discourage the formation of families (e.g., welfare payments are cut off in many American states if a recipient marries a working person) and encourage the break-up of families (e.g., no-fault divorce in the US is often financially rewarding for the non custodial parent, usually the father).

Libertarian solutions favored by the political right have contributed even more directly to the erosion of social responsibilities and valued forms of communal life, particularly in the UK and the US. Far from producing beneficial communal consequences, the invisible hand of unregulated free-market capitalism undermines the family (e.g., few corporations provide enough leave to parents of newborn children), disrupts local communities (e.g., following plant closings or the shifting of corporate headquarters), and corrupts the political process (e.g., US politicians are often dependent on economic interest groups for their political survival, with the consequence that they no longer represent the community at large). Moreover, the valorization of greed in the Thatcher/Reagan era justified the extension of instrumental considerations governing relationships in the marketplace into spheres previously informed by a sense of uncalculated reciprocity and civil obligation. This trend has been reinforced by increasing globalization, which pressures states into conforming to the dictates of the international marketplace.

More specifically in the American context, communitarian thinkers such as Mary Ann Glendon indict a new version of rights discourse that has achieved dominance of late (Glendon 1991). Whereas the assertion of rights was once confined to matters of essential human interest, a strident rights rhetoric has colonized contemporary political discourse, thus leaving little room for reasoned discussion and compromise, justifying the neglect of social responsibilities without which a society could not function, and ultimately weakening all appeals to rights by devaluing the really important ones.

To remedy this imbalance between rights and responsibilities in the US, political communitarians propose a moratorium on the manufacture of new rights and changes to our ‘habits of the heart’ away from exclusive focus on personal fulfillment and towards concern with bolstering families, schools, neighborhoods, and national political life, changes to be supported by certain public policies. Notice that this proposal takes for granted basic civil and political liberties already in place, thus alleviating the concern that communitarians are embarking on a slippery slope to authoritarianism. Still, there may be a concern that marginalized groups demanding new rights, e.g., homosexual couples seeking the right to legally sanctioned marriage, will be paying the price for the excesses of others if the communitarian proposal to declare a moratorium on the minting of new rights is put into effect.

More serious from the standpoint of those generally sympathetic to communitarian aspirations, however, is the question of what exactly this has to do with community. For one thing, Etzioni himself seeks to justify his policies with reference to need to maintain a balance between social order and freedom, (Etzioni 1996) as opposed to appealing to the importance of community. But there is nothing distinctively communitarian about the preoccupation with social order; both liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Burkean conservatives affirm the need for order. And when the term community is employed by political communitarians, it seems to mean anything they want it to mean. Worse, as Elizabeth Frazer has argued, it has often been used to justify hierarchical arrangements and delegitimize areas of conflict and contestation in modern societies (Frazer 1999).

Still, it is possible to make sense of the term community as a normative ideal.[13] Communitarians begin by positing a need to experience our lives as bound up with the good of the communities out of which our identity has been constituted. This excludes contingent attachments such as golf-club memberships, that do not usually bear on ones sense of identity and well-being (the co-authors of Habits of the Heart (Bellah et al. 1985) employ the term ‘lifestyle enclaves’ to describe these attachments). Unlike pre-modern defenders of Gemeinshaft, however, it is assumed that there are many valued forms of communal life in the modern world. So the distinctive communitarian political project is to identify valued forms of community and to devise policies designed to protect and promote them, without sacrificing too much freedom. Typically, communitarians would invoke the following types of communities:

  1. Communities of place, or communities based on geographical location. This is perhaps the most common meaning associated with the word community. In this sense, community is linked to locality, in the physical, geographical sense of a community that is located somewhere. It can refer to a small village or a big city. A community of place also has an affective component — it refers to the place one calls ‘home’, often the place where one is born and bred and the place where one would like to end one's days even if home is left as an adult. At the very least, communitarians posit an interest in identifying with familiar surroundings.

In terms of political implications, it means that, for example, political authorities ought to consider the existent character of the local community when considering plans for development (Jane Jacobs famously documented the negative effects of razing, instead of renovating, run-down tenements that are replaced by functionally adequate but characterless low-income housing blocs (Jacobs 1965). Other suggestions to protect communities of place include: granting community councils veto power over building projects that fail to respect existent architectural styles; implementing laws regulating plant closures so as to protect local communities from the effects of rapid capital mobility and sudden industrial change; promoting local-ownership of corporations; (Shuman 1999) and imposing restrictions on large-scale discount outlets such as Wal-Mart that threaten to displace small, fragmented, and diverse family and locally owned stores (Ehrenhalt 1999).

  1. Communities of memory, or groups of strangers who share a morally-significant history. This term — first employed by the co-authors of Habits of the Heart — refers to imagined communities that have a shared history going back several generations. Besides tying us to the past, such communities turn us towards the future — members strive to realize the ideals and aspirations embedded in past experiences of those communities, seeing their efforts as being, in part, contributions to a common good. They provide a source of meaning and hope in peoples lives. Typical examples include the nation and language-based ethnocultural groups.

In Western liberal democracies, this typically translates into various nation-building exercises meant to nourish the bonds of commonality that tie people to their nations, such as national service and national history lessons in school textbooks. Self-described republicans such as Michael Sandel place special emphasis upon the national political community and argue for measures that increase civic engagement and public-spiritedness (Sandel 1996). However, there is increased recognition of the multi-national nature of contemporary states, and modern Western states must also try to make room for the political rights of minority groups. These political measures have been widely discussed in the recent literature on nationalism, citizenship, and multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995, Macedo 2000, Tamir 1993).

  1. Psychological communities, or communities of face-to-face personal interaction governed by sentiments of trust, co-operation, and altruism. This refers to a group of persons who participate in common activity and experience a psychological sense of togetherness as shared ends are sought. Such communities, based on face-to-face interaction, are governed by sentiments of trust, cooperation, and altruism in the sense that constituent members have the good of the community in mind and act on behalf of the communitys interest. They differ from communities of place by not being necessarily defined by locality and proximity. The differ from communities of memory in the sense that they are more ‘real’, they are typically based on face to face social interaction at one point in time and consequently tend to be restricted in size.[14] The family is the prototypical example. Other examples include small-scale work or school settings founded on trust and social cooperation.

Communitarians tend to favor policies designed to protect and promote ties to the family and family-like groups. This would include such measures as encouraging marriage and increasing the difficulty of legal marriage dissolution. These policies are supported by empirical evidence that points to the psychological and social benefits of marriage (Waite 1996). Communitarians also favor political legislation that can help to restructure education in such a way that peoples deepest needs in membership and participation in psychological communities are tapped at a young age. The primary school system in Japan, where students learn about group cooperation and benefits and rewards are assigned to the classroom as a whole rather than to individual students, could be a useful model (Reid 1999).

What makes the political project of communitarianism distinctive is that it involves the promotion all three forms of valued communal life. This leads, however, to the worry that seeking the goods of various communities may conflict in practice. Etzioni, for example, argues for a whole host of pro-family measures: mothers and fathers should devote more time and energy to parenting (in view of the fact that most childcare centers do a poor job of caring for children), labor unions and employers ought to make it easier for parents to work at home, and the government should force corporations to provide six months of paid leave and another year of unpaid leave (Etzioni 1993, ch.2 and Etzioni 1996, ch.6). The combined effect of these changes of the heart and public policies in all likelihood would be to make citizens into largely private, family-centered persons.

Yet Etzioni also argues that the American political system is corrupt to the core, concluding that only extensive involvement in public affairs by virtuous citizens can remedy the situation: ‘once citizens are informed, they must make it their civic duty to organize others locally, regionally, and nationally to act on their understanding of what it takes to clean up public life in America’ (Etzioni 1993, 244) But few can afford sufficient time and energy to devote themselves fully to both family life and public affairs, and favoring one ideal is most likely to erode the other. Surely it is no coincidence that republican America in Jeffersons day relied on active, public-spirited male citizens largely freed from family responsibilities. Conversely, societies composed of persons leading rich and fulfilling family lives (such as contemporary Singapore) tend to be ruled by paternalistic despots who can rely on a compliant, politically apathetic populace.

Communitarians who advocate both increased commitment to public affairs and strengthened ties to the workplace (to the point that it becomes a psychological community) also face the problem of conflicting commitments. Michael Sandel, for example, speaks favorable of ‘proud craftsmen’ in the Jacksonian era and of Louis Brandeis's idea of ‘industrial democracy, in which workers participated in management and shared responsibilities for running the business’ (Sandel 1996, 170, 213; Bell 1997b) Identification with the workplace and industrial democracy are said to improve workers civic capacities, but that may not be the case. In the same way that extensive involvement in family life can conflict with commitments to public life, few persons will have sufficient time and energy for extensive participation in both workplace and public affairs. Recall that the republican society of ancient Athens relied on active, public-spirited males freed from the need to work (slaves did most of the drudge labor).

It is also worth noting that devotion to the workplace can undermine family life. As Tatsuo Inoue of Tokyo University argues, Japanese-style communitarianism — strong communal identity based on the workplace — sometimes leads to karoshi (death from overwork) and frequently deprives workers of ‘the right to sit down at the dinner table with their families’ (Inoue 1993). Just as liberals (pace Ronald Dworkin) sometimes have to choose between ideals (e.g., freedom and equality) that come into conflict with one another if a serious effort is made to realize any one of them fully, so communitarians may have to make some hard choices between valued forms of communal life.

Still, there may be some actual or potential win-win scenarios cases where promoting a particular form of communal life can promote, rather than undermine, other forms — and political communitarians will of course favor change of this sort. For example, critics have objected to residential community associations, or ‘walled communities', on the grounds that they undermine attachment to the polity at large and erode the social cohesion and trust needed to promote social justice and sustain the democratic process (McKenzie 1994, Bell 1995).[15] Might it then be possible to reform urban planning so that people can nurture strong local communities without undermining attachment to the national community, perhaps even strengthening broader forms of public-spiritedness? Many practical suggestions along these lines have been raised. Architects and urban planners in the US known as the New Urbanists, for example, have proposed various measures to strengthen community building — affordable housing, public transport, pedestrian focused environments, and public space as an integral part of neighborhoods — that would not have the ‘privatizing’ consequences of gated communities. The problem, as Gerald Frug points out, is that ‘virtually everything they want to do is now illegal. To promote the new urbanist version of urban design, cities would have revise municipal zoning laws and development policy from top to bottom.’[16] This points to the need for public policy recommendations explicitly designed to favor complementing forms of communal attachments.

Just as it would be wrong to assume that communitarian goals always conflict, so one should allow for the possibility that individual rights and communitarian goals can co-exist and complement each other.[17] In Singapore, for example, it can be argued that more secure democratic rights would have the effect of strengthening commitment to the common national good.[18] The Singapore government does not hide the fact that it makes life difficult for many who aim to enter the political arena on the side of opposition parties: Between 1971 and 1993, according to Attorney General Chan Sek Keong, eleven opposition politicians were made bankrupt (and hence ineligible to run in elections).[19] Whether intended or not, such actions send an unpatriotic message to the community at large: Politics is a dangerous game for those who haven't been specially anointed by the top leadership of the ruling party, so you should stick to your own private affairs. As Singaporean journalist Cherian George puts it, one can hardly blame people for ignoring their social and political obligations ‘when they hear so many cautionary tales: Of Singaporeans whose careers came to a premature end after they voiced dissent; of critics who found themselves under investigation; of individuals who were detained without trial even though they seemed not to pose any real threat; of tapped phones and opened letters’. The moral of these stories: In Singapore, better to mind your own business, make money, and leave politics to the politicians.’[20] Put positively, if the aim is to secure attachment to the community at large, then implementing genuinely competitive elections, including the freedom to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation,[21] is an important first step.

The Singapore case, however, points to another dimension of the politics of community that brings us back to the communitarian defense of cultural particularism. Democratic reformers in Singapore typically think of democracy in terms of free and fair competitive elections what Western analysts often label ‘minimal democracy’. In Hong Kong, the situation is similar — the aspiration to ‘full’ democracy put forward by social critics turns out to mean (nothing more than) an elected legislature and Chief Executive. Put differently, it is quite striking that the republican tradition in communitarian thought with its vision of strong democracy supported by active, public-spirited citizens who participate in political decision-making and held shape the future direction of their society though political debate seems largely absent from political discourse in Singapore and Hong Kong, and perhaps East Asia more generally. Many East Asians are clamoring for secure democratic rights, but this rarely translates into the demand that all citizens should be committed to politics on an ongoing basis or the view that, as David Miller puts it, ‘politics is indeed a necessary part of the good life’ (Miller 2000). At one level, the relative absence of republican ideals can be explained by the fact that there are no equivalents of Aristotle and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in East Asian philosophy. It can also be argued that republicanism fails to resonate because East Asians typically place more emphasis on other forms of communal life — the family in particular has been important theme in Confucian ethical theory and practice (relative to Western philosophy). To the extent that different forms of communal life do conflict in practice, in short, it may the case that different cultures will draw the line in different places — and they may have a strong moral case in doing so, if these lines conform to the views shared by both defenders and critics of the political status quo.


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